Abstract
This paper presents empirical evidence that pork barrel spending, as a best proxy for targeted spending through legislative coalition formation, is significantly affected by the party homogeneity among congresspersons of a given state. Moreover, the magnitude of homogeneity, when measured as uniform or non-uniform, carries larger magnitude than a state delegation’s congruence in either chamber with the current majority party. The result suggests that coalition value is a major motivator of U.S. congressional budgeting.
Recommended Citation
Roth, M. Garrett and Klingensmith, Zachary
(2023)
"It Doesn’t Pay to Be Purple: An Empirical Test of Pork Barrel Spending and Congressional Delegation Homogeneity,"
Pennsylvania Economic Review: Vol. 30:
No.
2, Article 5.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.65193/3067-8080.1033