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The Primacy of Hope

Abstract

This paper raises the question of whether there is anything foundational to hopefulness when considering it as a virtue, and uses the Aristotelian distinction between virtue in the “natural sense” and virtue in the “strict sense” to make the claim that hopefulness has a primacy to it. While that primacy rests on the existence of care and responsiveness of community, those caretakers must themselves be possessed of hopefulness, which, at its best will be virtuous.
“[H]opefulness is crucial to ethical improvement,” writes G. Scott Gravlee, in an article entitled “Aristotle on Hope”. He is one amongst a handful of virtue theorists who discuss hope or hopefulness as a virtue while suggesting that there is something fundamental or primary to hope amongst the virtues. This is the ground that this paper explores. For Gravlee, hope “underlies the confidence involved in both courage and natural high-mindedness, and it underlies the deliberation and self-confidence necessary both to improve one’s circumstances and to cultivate the excellences of character.”

Another excellent example of such a suggestion comes from Nancy Snow, who embraces Aristotle’s distinction between intellectual and moral virtues in her discussion of hope as an intellectual virtue in her chapter in Michael Austin’s anthology on applied virtue ethics. Distinguishing intellectual virtues as those seeking truth from moral virtues—those seeking human (and personal) flourishing—Snow writes that intellectual virtues generally “motivate their possessor to form beliefs in ways reliably conducive to the successful attainment of knowledge.” “[H]ope especially” she says, is a “game-changer” when it comes to that motivation. I read her as implying the same thing about hope as a moral virtue—that hope especially motivates hopers to form beliefs conducive to opening pathways to personally flourishing. The impetus for this paper comes from a question in Gravlee’s final footnote, and Snow’s adverb. Gravlee asks: “... is hopefulness deeper than any virtue, a sort of prerequisite or necessary condition for the development of virtue?”

In contrast, a comment from a recent anonymous reviewer challenges this suggestion of primacy. The reviewer wrote: “the necessity of hope/hopefulness for moral progress... does not seem to be controversial [read: philosophically interesting]. Indeed, it seems intuitively clear that no prospect can be rationally pursued unless one takes its realization to be possible and desirable in some respect.” Echoing this reviewer’s comment, Victoria McGeer writes in her 2004 article “The Art of Good Hope” that “hope—or hoping—is not an option for us cognitively competent human
beings.” So, is hope or hopefulness such a given in human cognition that a discussion of its primacy is a fool’s errand? Or, are Gravlee and Snow hinting at something philosophically valuable? After a brief sketch of how some forms of hope have the elements of virtue, I will turn to an examination of hopefulness in its status as a virtue to unpack the hope to which Gravlee alludes in his footnote, and Snow in her adverb.

**Nussbaum and Virtue**

But first, I want to borrow some of Martha Nussbaum’s language about virtue. In defending Aristotle’s approach to virtue acquisition as a non-relativist account useful cross-culturally, Nussbaum describes Aristotle’s process as one in which he identifies places (“spheres of [human] experience” in Nussbaum’s phrase) where it matters how you act, and then evaluates what he believes it means to choose well or act well in that sphere. What comes out of that evaluation is an understanding of what it means, in Nussbaum’s words, to be “stably disposed to act appropriately” in a given sphere. Nussbaum is arguing that all human behavior can be judged as appropriate or inappropriate within its own cultural context. Where choice is “nonoptional” and somewhat “problematic,” as Nussbaum puts it, there you have a subject for ethical deliberation, and the potential for a relevant stable disposition to be identifiable.

The present project is an attempt to examine whether hope has some primary role to play amongst the virtues; not just in some noncontroversial, intuitive sense, but in terms of the role it plays in a structural sense in the building of other virtues. If something is at least somewhat problematic, we have to have motivation to pursue a solution. The pursuit of what is appropriate behavior in any particular sphere, I want to suggest, involves—at its base—hopefulness that what is appropriate matters. When that hopefulness is seen through the lens of virtue theory, it seems—at its best—to have all the makings itself of a virtue. I believe this inquiry exposes a kind of primacy of
that virtue in the study of ethics, and the pursuit of justice. I try to explain what I mean in the next three sections.

Hopefulness as a virtue

The general view of hope, whether in a deontological or a virtue theory context, entails a cognitive state that contains a belief in the possibility (something greater than zero) of some desired outcome (on a spectrum from something specific—a wallet’s safe return—to something very general—a vague positive future). “To hope” in any substantive sense cannot simply be a matter of a passing wish. Hope has to be for something worth hoping for (at least to the individual). It has to be a substantive enough state for the desire for the outcome to be a sustained kind of presence. The hoped-for has to be at some distance from the present, then, and the hoping that occurs in its direction has to linger. There is an important distinction between an instance of hope (“I hope William will cook me breakfast”) and a general state of hopefulness that will be worthy of the status of virtue, as discussed below. Hope has to be a hope for something (specific or vague) that is elusive or difficult to attain. If it comes easily there is no reason for hope. If it is something that will occur as a matter of course then it does not require hope (even though we might use that language). Hope can be malicious or malevolent (that the neighbors go bankrupt or that there is bloody violence at the hockey game). It can be about the past, if the outcome is not yet known.

If hope in some of its incarnations can be seen as a virtue, as many have suggested, it must meet the criteria Aristotle attaches to the term. So for Aristotle, as we know, a virtue is “a state of character” or a disposition which involves “both actions and emotions” with the goal of seeking “the mean in all things relative to us.” For Nussbaum, this translates into possession of the stable disposition to act appropriately in a given sphere. All virtues, and thus hopefulness if it qualifies as virtue, are i) dispositions or character traits that develop over time and that ii) “aim at the good” or position us to “act appropriately.” To distinguish instances from dispositions, I will use “hope”
when referring to individual instances of hope, either mental imaginings or actions. Following Snow, I use “hopefulness” as the name for the character trait that, at its best, generates individual instances of hope identifiable as virtuous. A character trait worthy of the status of virtue must be one worth developing insofar as it causes us to act appropriately or, equivalently, aids us in the attainment of human flourishing or eudaimonia. While I cannot attempt any wholesale discussion of eudaimonia here, it is part of the goal of this paper to suggest that hopefulness seems to have a foundational or primary role to play amongst the virtues, and thus is necessary for the pursuit of eudaimonia—if Aristotle is right that human flourishing requires the development of a harmonious set of character traits that motivate us to act in ways that benefit ourselves and/or others.

Since virtues are character traits that generate individual virtuous acts, the development of, for instance, the virtue of generosity positions one for the production of any number of instances of appropriate generosity over the course of a life. Snow describes this as the “architectonic” dimension of virtue. Having the virtue of hopefulness generates instances of hope as well, but, I want to argue, it does something else also. It gives us the motivation to see that acting appropriately (virtuously) matters. As a virtue, hopefulness will have been cultivated over time into a character trait that produces individual instances of virtuous hoping—appropriate amounts of hope directed toward appropriate outcomes. Consider the current political climate in which I am writing: six months before what looks at this moment to be the most contentious presidential election in living memory. To be hopeful in a virtuous way at this moment is, at least in part, to have specific attitudes or cognitive states that contain belief in the possibility of an outcome that will be positive—and thus desired—for the country and the globe, without having confidence or expectation that that will be the case. Thus the desire for and the belief in the possibility that the best candidate will be chosen will serve as motivation for any number of actions (including mental imaginings): e.g., conversations with undecided friends, attitudes that keep one in good spirits in an
absurd political climate, political contributions, actually voting, etc. Pettit (2004) says hopefulness allows us to “adopt a strategy” which could generate many different actions or behaviors that would serve that hope.\(^{15}\) Adrienne Martin argues that some forms of hope contain a “justificatory rationale” which props up our agency.\(^{16}\) Martin develops a dualistic account of hope that she believes better encapsulates what hoping is than the “orthodox definition” found regularly in the scholarship on hope: a definition that coincides with my starting place; i.e., belief in the possibility plus the desire. Martin sees this belief-plus-desire structure, while inadequate for explaining all forms of hope she considers, to be the very thing that offers the rationale for hope at times when there are very thin possibilities of desirable outcomes. If one has real hope in the face of, say, a one percent chance of survival from cancer, it is because one is resting one’s motivation on that belief-plus-desire: using it (the hope) as the justification for one’s being that one percent. She argues that the desire in a desired outcome has features that we use as rationales when we hope.\(^{17}\) While I cannot take up a full challenge to Martin here (and I am in agreement with and admiring of much that she says), I want to suggest that virtue theory does an even better job of catching up many of the nuances and complexities that she points out. If one possesses the virtue of hopefulness, that virtue will be there to rely on in situations such as those Martin describes. In her example of Alan and Bess, the cancer patients, she describes Alan as saying he hopes the drug works but “he rarely appeals to his hope as a justification” for any of his actions or imaginings. I would say this more closely approximates “wishing” than hoping. It does not meet the criteria for virtuous hope, certainly. Bess, on the other hand, sees the one percent chance of survival as a reason to go on. She uses that one percent as motivation for her actions and strategies.\(^{18}\) I would describe Bess as possessed of the virtue of hopefulness, which in this arena helps her to generate strategies that, amongst other things, keep her spirits up.
For hopefulness to be virtuous, it has to be “appropriate,” i.e., the mean between extremes within a particular cultural context and relative to the individual. Too much hopefulness would suggest, e.g., the naïve assumption that everything will work out fine, or is “meant to be”—a phrase based in unjustified assumptions about, perhaps, supernaturally predetermined outcomes. Such a position perpetuates complacency and sets one up for vast disappointment down the road. Too little hopefulness would lead to paralysis or despair. Thus, in agreement with Snow, Barbro Fröding (2012), Gravlee, and others, hopefulness as a positive disposition or character trait fits the definition of a virtue—a trait that aims at the goal of “acting appropriately”, at promoting the well-being of self or others—as that which “makes a [hu]man good and which makes [one] do [one’s] own work well.”19

Natural vs. Strict Virtue

Aristotle’s distinction between intellectual and moral virtues helps in understanding the territory hopefulness encompasses. If intellectual virtues aim us towards the true, and moral virtues aim us towards personal flourishing, it is because of the work that goes into their development. I want to borrow another important piece from Aristotle to think through my current goal: his distinction between “natural” virtue and virtue “in the strict” or “full” sense,20 as Fröding reminds us.21 As regards moral virtues, someone with natural virtue has acquired a disposition to be more or less stably disposed to act appropriately in a given sphere but has not deliberated about the worth of this disposition. One might be generally slow to anger by temperament, for instance. Truthfulness may be a natural virtue if one’s community molds one—via, perhaps, rewards and punishments—to develop such a trait, and if one unreflectively conforms to that molding. Possession of a brightness or optimism about the future may be a natural tendency for those who have infrequently been disappointed. Hopefulness as a natural virtue may be seen in the naivety or idealism of youth. To be virtuous in the strict sense, we need to practice and be practiced in deliberating about what makes
for the most appropriate actions in given circumstances. This is what Nussbaum says all cultures do—consciously or not. This kind of deliberation (i.e., what Aristotle calls *phronesis*) is work which must be done by the individual for themselves in order for that individual to come to a depth of understanding about why the virtue is a benefit. Because, as Aristotle requires, being virtuous entails acting “to[wards] the right person, to the right extent, and at the right time, *for the right reason,* and in the right way,” but the individual does not work in isolation. Arriving at a depth of understanding of those right reasons may, in fact, require a public dialogue. One must be willing and accustomed to exposing one’s own thinking to others’ examination to ensure one’s thinking is clear. As J.S. Mill would have it, public dialogue is necessary because we gain a “clearer perception and livelier impression of truth” when our errors collide with better thinking. We have to be interested in, respectful of, and authentically engaged with others’ points of view. We have to be comfortable bringing our own ethical presumptions out in the open, allowing scrutiny; and we have to be in a community that encourages that sort of process. We do not need to conclude that all deliberation has been accomplished in order to be justified in believing that we have a reasonable and appropriate depth of understanding. To be virtuous in the strict sense is to have an understanding of what’s appropriate that comes with deliberation and experience; nurtured within a community that values that process and the resulting dispositions.

Nussbaum, acknowledging a debt to Rawls’ “reflective equilibrium,” writes: “justification is achieved not by individuals acting alone but by debate amongst Socratically deliberating individuals.” Michael Sandel talks in these terms as well. Character development, in his view, should be “a public, not merely private concern.” As regards the development of the virtue of hopefulness in this strict sense, then, I must be able to articulate what is good about the possession of the trait. I attempt to do this in the next section.

**Hopefulness as necessary and primary**
It seems to be the case that developing the disposition of hopefulness specifically is necessary for the moral deliberation that builds virtues in general into virtues in the strict sense, and thus hopefulness has a kind of primacy in this process not seen in other virtues. Gravlee asserts that hope is crucial for ethical development. McGeer also sees hopefulness as crucial to human agency generally. Ethical development requires ethical deliberation—and hopefulness is crucial for both. Without some degree of confidence in the future we cannot meaningfully commit to any task. I must believe that there is some possibility that the future I am imagining can come about. And, this seems to have to come before having the courage of my convictions or using wisdom to find the right path. Yet I do not need to be imagining a very clear future. Consider Jonathan Lear’s presentation of Plenty Coups’ “radical hope.” Plenty Coups cannot imagine the future: he cannot imagine what his people will be when they have been displaced from the land and the way of life that made them who they are. Yet he has hopefulness about the future. I do not need to consider the desired outcome particularly likely either: Martin’s cancer patients or a member of the Black Lives Matter movement. Still, coming to a depth of understanding that belief of this sort is the right attitude to hold gives one the rational basis for a hopefulness built into one’s personality but does not require that each individual action arising from that disposition be reasoned through. This is just what virtue is: having the character trait that triggers appropriate actions without the need for deliberation in each instance. At the same time, the instances (acts or imaginings) of hope that emanate from virtuous hopefulness incorporate a desire for the outcome (future or unknown past) I am imagining, and contain a belief that that future is the right future for which to hope. Again, this sounds similar to the justificatory rationale Martin posits. An emphasis on virtue seems to untangle some of what appears problematic for Martin. The groundwork that created the virtue (in the strict sense) is where ethical deliberation unfolds, and it is why that deliberation can be poised to
transform into moral progress. The motivation to hope is not explicit in each instance of hope. Possession of the virtue has the motivation built in.

Virtuous hopefulness—the state that grounds instances of appropriate hope and generates strategies—if it is a virtue in the strict sense, has the rationale for the virtue generally worked through. There is reason to have general hopefulness embedded in your personality: it motivates actions and strategies, it gives one ‘fixity of purpose,’ it guards against despair, it uplifts or sustains one’s spirit. The rationale that the disposition of hopefulness is an appropriate (and even essential) trait to possess has a great deal to do with the ethical deliberation it inspires. Hopefulness precedes and produces the commitment to hope in particular instances. Gravlee writes, “‘[w]ithout good hope or confidence in either the circumstances or in oneself and the worth of one’s actions, deliberation and striving concerning self-improvement will cease—for hopefulness underlies deliberation . . .’” So, if I possess the trait of hopefulness, it will come automatically to me that I could be the one percent cancer survivor or that demonstrating in the streets is not an exercise in futility. An equally justifiable hope would be for a dignified death or a truly sustainable energy source. The rational justification is available to me if I spend time reflecting on what my hopeful disposition means for me, but I do not need to produce that rationale in the moment because my hope is emanating from a character trait I already possess.

… as primary

In Snow’s work on hope as an intellectual virtue, she briefly discusses hope’s relevance as a moral virtue. Summarizing Roberts and Wood who note that “moral virtues have intellectual dimensions and intellectual virtues have moral dimensions,” Snow offers an example where hopefulness as an intellectual virtue motivates a researcher with a confidence (i.e., hopefulness) that the truth she seeks will be attainable; hopefulness as a moral virtue gives this researcher the motivation to believe that attaining knowledge is a path to personal flourishing. In general, the
virtues appear to work this way. Hopefulness is obviously not unique in having a presence in both categories. One can have perseverance or courage, for instance, in the pursuit of truth and in the pursuit of personal flourishing. But does hopefulness have a special significance in those categories? Is hope especially important? I will focus on the moral virtues side of the question.

If a virtue is just the sort of thing from which individual virtuous actions emanate, then, if we are possessed of the disposition to ‘x’, at the appropriate time and place we will ‘x’ because of that disposition—without deliberating, without thinking—barring significant countervailing forces. If one has the virtue of honesty, the motivation for truth-telling is built into one’s disposition. The potential for lying is very small, or even non-existent. One will not be directly motivated to tell the truth—one will simply automatically tell the truth, even when it is inconvenient. The action will be sparked by the circumstance, which will have triggered the disposition. No cognitive work needs to be done in that moment. Moral virtues, acquired through repetition of the relevant virtuous actions, are character traits by which people automatically act in the right way. We can talk about the motivation to act virtuously in the moment, but that motivation is not in the moment. It comes about in a much more indirect way. This is where the primacy of hopefulness comes in. As Aristotle knew, the community must be involved in the development of virtues. It must be actively deliberating about what it means to act appropriately in given contexts and examining what are the most appropriate virtues to acquire and to pass on. Ideally, children will be encouraged to mimic a variety of beneficial attitudes which over time become embedded in an overall virtuous disposition—the natural disposition, with several harmonious parts. Within any one child, though, there is one virtue that matters more than the others, I want to argue: the disposition to be hopeful of a desirable future. I want to suggest that this is the hopefulness that seems to be the base for ethical deliberation, and at this stage—where the community has instilled the habit (for the child unreflectively)—it is at the level of a natural virtue. If hopefulness is crucial for ethical deliberation, and if ethical deliberation
(or phronesis) is what is necessary to develop virtue in the strict sense, then it appears as though hopefulness as a virtue in the strict sense must have originated in another kind of hopefulness—hopefulness as a natural virtue—I believe this is the “noncontroversial” hope my anonymous reviewer referenced. If we haven’t been nurtured well by our communities, this disposition may not develop. I take this up in the next section. For now, I want to note that this leads, at first glance then, to the presumption that it is not hope that is at the foundation—it must be care. But there is another layer at play here, rather obviously.

The care of the child, which will include modeling appropriate behavior and encouraging particular behaviors in the child that creates the natural virtue would not occur unless the caretaker were hopeful that the caring will matter. And I do not think it matters whether the carer has hopefulness in the strict sense or merely in the natural sense. While, to develop natural virtue the child must be cared for, it is my claim that that care is itself motivated by a hopefulness. The community creates the potential for the disposition to develop; their responsiveness to the child is grounded in the hope that it matters.

I can of course imagine despairing caretakers in, say, a post-apocalyptic world, who have no hope for the future but do not want their children to know how dismal things really are. They pretend hopefulness so that the children will have positive outlooks. This set of circumstances could also produce the natural virtue of hopefulness in the children as the children will mimic the adults’ artificial hopefulness. The need to be responsive to the child motivates the deception. This is still a hopefulness of a kind; e.g., “[b]y deceiving, I hope to make this childhood less painful.” But, hopefulness as virtue in the strict sense would likely be out of reach to those children as they mature because public deliberation would later expose the realities.

Children and Hope
It is certainly true that “no prospect can be rationally pursued unless one takes its realization to be possible and desirable.” But this is something that we have to learn; that we have to acquire. And, sadly, it is also true that many of us do not get that opportunity. There are several ways of looking at the acquisition of character traits in developmental psychology, but I am going to use the literature on trauma to connect my argument to issues of social justice. The California Alliance for the Mentally Ill estimates that there are over 20 million children in the U.S. suffering from PTSD because of their exposure to the trauma of natural disasters or, more commonly, psycho-social trauma. Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and Tornado Alley annually are examples of the former.

Physical or sexual abuse, homelessness, the stress of living in a violence-torn neighborhood can all affect the way a child’s brain develops. The D.C. Children’s Law Center summarizes the problem:

Early childhood exposure to trauma . . . changes the way the brain develops. This change can result in major problems with the child’s executive functioning and self-regulation – causing a traumatized child to overreact in a situation that seems ordinary to others. Trauma also can affect children’s language development, inhibit their academic achievement and make it difficult to form relationships with both peers and adults. Traumatized children may develop hypervigilance, emotional withdrawal or dissociation, and spend the school day focusing solely on their safety – making it impossible to learn.

Such conditions make it impossible to deliberate, making it impossible to develop any virtue in the strict sense, making it impossible to make moral or intellectual progress. Such conditions make it impossible to develop any of the virtues in the strict sense because, I want to argue, at its most primary, hopefulness as a disposition has no possibility of gaining a toehold.

Those who are most resilient in the face of such trauma, the research shows—no surprise—are those with intact and available emotionally healthy adult care-givers. Lenore Terr did groundbreaking work in this area. McGeer notes this as well. Living in poverty makes one
especially vulnerable to these traumas. It becomes a community or a societal failing, then, often, if children cannot make moral progress. Hopefulness is crucial for ethical development. Poverty, amongst many other things, can dash such hope. If we are instilled with hopefulness as a disposition, it will be early in our development, led by our caretakers and other concerned members of our community. It is out of hopefulness that the other virtues come—in the strict sense. Endowing our children with the natural virtue of hopefulness, I am arguing, is what is crucial to them maturing into ethical deliberators later, who can take on the project of developing into virtuous beings in the strict sense.

**McGeer and Agency**

With attention to the psychological literature, McGeer offers an interesting discussion of the development of agency, as assisted by parents or other care-givers, and she draws attention to the deeply social nature of hope as it is intertwined with agency. This is relevant to my thesis because of the question of motivation. Hope (my “hopefulness”) develops in us, she explains, through our mimicking of others, through our “internaliz[ing] the idealizing work of others.” Here, this mimicking is about our own potential. We mimic—when caring is at its best—because we are given the message that we are on our way to our adult potential. “According to hope theory as articulated by psychologists,” McGeer writes, “hope is a cognitive activity that involves setting concrete goals, finding pathways to achieve those goals, and tapping one’s willpower or agency to move along pathways to the specified goals.” Side by side with virtue theory, this suggests that hopefulness develops over time through trial and error into a more and more permanent disposition. We are best positioned for the later ethical deliberation we will do as mature adults when hopefulness is instilled in brains free from trauma, and nurtured by our community. McGeer writes: “the world must be somewhat responsive to keep our capacity to hope alive.” We need hopefulness as virtue in the natural sense in order to be motivated to seek positive outcomes, in
order to make moral progress, in order to develop the virtue of hopefulness in the strict sense. What acts we are encouraged to repeat within our community will set the stage for what kind of hopers we will become. So, community matters hugely, as Aristotle understood.

In sum, then, for cognitively competent adults: if hopefulness is necessary for ethical deliberation and if ethical deliberation is necessary for moral progress, including, amongst other things, the acquisition of the virtue of hopefulness in the strict sense, what seems crucial is that hopefulness as a natural virtue be passed to us as children by our community. And, thus, it seems, if we value moral progress and the pursuit of justice, first, we have to ensure that children are cared for well, and then, as adults, we are all morally obligated to maintain the virtue of hopefulness—at least the natural version. Better still would be to feel obligated to deliberate about the virtue of hopefulness in the public sphere until its value as a virtue in the strict sense is thoroughly embedded in the tissues of our culture.

2 Gravlee, 477.
4 Snow, 165.
5 My emphasis. Snow, 165.
6 Gravlee, 477.
9 Nussbaum, 2000, 441.
10 Nussbaum, 2000, 442.
12 Aristotle Nichomachean Ethics [NE], II.v.1106a10, Eudemian Ethics II.1220a; NE II.vi.1106a30.
14 Snow, 155.
15 Pettit, 158.
16 Martin, 61.
17 Martin 7, 58-61.
18 Martin, 15.
19 Aristotle, NE II.vi.1106a20.
20 Aristotle, NE VI.xiii.1144b.
The phrase “depth of understanding” is borrowed from Laurence Thomas’s 1989 discussion of what it means to be virtuous in *Living Morally: A Psychology of Moral Character*, Temple University Press.

*Nichomachean Ethics* II.vi.1106b20, emphasis mine.


Nussbaum, 2011, 77.


Gravlee, 466-7.


Perry, B.D., 107-8.

McGeer, 108.

McGeer, 108.

McGeer, 105.

McGeer, 103.

McGeer, 108.